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PERSISTENT OBJECTORS, COOPERATION, AND 
THE UTILITY OF CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 
JOEL P. TRACHTMAN* 
INTRODUCTION 
As pointed out by Professors Bradley and Gulati,1 the International 
Law Association’s (“ILA”) 2000 study on customary international law 
(“CIL”) presents the conventional wisdom regarding the persistent objector 
rule: 
There is fairly widespread agreement that, even if there is a 
persistent objector rule in international law, it applies only 
when the customary rule is in the process of emerging. It 
does not, therefore, benefit States which came into 
existence only after the rule matured, or which became 
involved in the activity in question only at a later stage. Still 
less can it be invoked by those who existed at the time and 
were already engaged in the activity which is the subject of 
the rule, but failed to object at that stage. In other words, 
there is no ‘subsequent objector’ rule.2 
The ILA study points out that the persistent objector rule applies only 
during formation of the rule. This view is what Bradley and Gulati refer to 
as the “Mandatory View:” that is, after a CIL rule is formed, it is 
impossible to unilaterally opt-out of it. 
For those who tend to see international law as analogous to contract 
law, it seems strange to criticize the Mandatory View. What would be left 
without it? Would CIL only address coordination problems and not 
cooperation problems? Or would there be some mechanism for 
discriminating between CIL rules (discriminating design), allowing some 
rules to be subject to the Mandatory View, while others are subject to the 
 
 * Professor of International Law, The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University. 
 1. Curtis A. Bradley & Mitu Gulati, Withdrawing from International Custom, 120 YALE L.J. 
202, 205 (2010). 
 2. INT’L LAW ASS’N, COMM. ON THE FORMATION OF CUSTOMARY (GEN.) INT’L LAW, 
STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES APPLICABLE TO THE FORMATION OF GENERAL CUSTOMARY 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 27 (2000). 
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“Default View” (defined by Bradley and Gulati as allowing subsequent 
withdrawal from CIL rules)?3 Bradley and Gulati concede that the default 
rule cannot work with an important class of cooperation problems and 
therefore accept that discriminating design is necessary. However, they fail 
to explain how an informal mechanism like custom could be structured to 
include a way to discriminate between cases where the Mandatory View 
would apply and those where the Default View would apply. I see this as a 
fundamental flaw in their proposal. 
Perhaps the better way to understand Bradley and Gulati’s work is not 
as a proposal for doctrinal change, but as a recognition of the malleable 
character and limits of CIL. The malleable character results from the fact 
that CIL is always in a zen-like process of becoming and un-becoming. 
Hence, the error of the conventional persistent objector rule might be in 
seeking artificially to distinguish between a period of formation and a 
period of application. A more socially rooted perspective might understand 
CIL as constantly being in a period of formation, until it is in a period of 
disintegration. The limits of CIL in this context arise from the very fact that 
it is always open to states to commence the process of disintegration of a 
rule. Moreover, from a legal realist perspective, CIL already can be 
understood to conform to the Default View perspective, because the 
remedies for violation often seem insufficient to induce compliance. 
However, a move to formalize the Default View might upset the existing 
equilibrium of incentives for compliance. 
From a consensus doctrinal standpoint, as opposed to this legal realist 
perspective, there is not today a “subsequent objector rule.” Instead, a 
different principle is applicable after formation. Consider, for example, the 
change from an absolute theory of sovereign immunity to a restrictive 
theory (the latter is a more permissive rule, allowing states to disallow 
sovereign immunity in more situations). Call this principle the “revision 
rule.” It is by no means a “subsequent objector” rule, but it denotes a 
process that a subsequent objector may begin. 
Thus, although CIL rules may arise despite the existence of a 
persistent objector, they may only be revised (downward to be less 
restrictive) based on a practice of violation, including opinio juris. There is 
a “ratcheting up” aspect to this structure, which some idealists might find 
attractive, and “sovereigntists” may find unattractive. Furthermore, in 
theory, a state may be a persistent objector to revision, but this would make 
revision practically impossible if it prevents the application of a less 
restrictive rule to those wishing to move toward the less restrictive rule. 
 
 3. Bradley & Gulati, supra note 1, at 206. 
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Bradley and Gulati highlight the comparison between the structure for 
entry into and exit from CIL, and the default structure for entry into and 
exit from a treaty. It is worth pointing out that the default structure for a 
treaty is similar to that for CIL: the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties (“Vienna Convention”) provides for termination of a treaty only in 
accordance with that treaty’s terms (or with the consent of all parties), and 
for withdrawal only if a right of withdrawal was intended or is implied.4 To 
be clear, where a treaty contains no provision allowing for withdrawal or 
termination, under the Vienna Convention, withdrawal or termination are 
only allowed if the parties intended to provide implicit permission for 
withdrawal or termination. 
In any event, unless there is a coordinated movement to establish a 
new, revised rule-based practice, such a practice must begin with a single 
state’s determination and action, in violation of the prior rule. Even if there 
is a coordinated moment of establishment, the issue remains whether there 
will be a coordinated opinio juris at that moment, completing the status of 
the new practice as customary law. This is one of the quirks of CIL: a 
violation may change the law, depending on subsequent action by others. 
Its character as a violation is clear unless there is a coordinated 
simultaneous change, but its status as the beginning of a new rule is 
otherwise unknown until subsequent actions unfold.  Hence, although the 
revision rule is no subsequent objector rule, it allows subsequent objectors 
to commence a process of contingent revision. I refer to this process as 
“contingent” revision because definitive revision only ensues if others 
follow the practice along with opinio juris. 
In their discussion of “reliance,” Bradley and Gulati concede that their 
“Default View” would not be conducive to resolution of certain types of 
cooperation problems.5 They suggest that CIL might not be a useful 
instrument to solve these types of problems in any event. In order to pursue 
this thought, I evaluate the relative utility of custom and treaties in 
addressing international public goods cooperation problems. 
I. INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS COOPERATION PROBLEMS 
One example of a public good is the reduction of carbon emissions; 
that is, consumption of the benefits of carbon reduction is (i) non-
excludible, and (ii) non-rivalrous. Because carbon reduction is a public 
good, without intervention it is likely to be under-supplied. Establishing an 
 
 4. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 42, 54, 56, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 
331, 8 I.L.M. 679. 
 5. Bradley & Mitu, supra note 1, at 254-58. 
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international legal rule that will cause an efficient level of carbon reduction 
is an international public goods cooperation problem. Assume that a group 
of n states is considering adopting a customary rule of reduction of carbon 
emissions by a specified percentage.6 
For simplicity’s sake, assume full compliance with the applicable CIL, 
consistent with the requirements of conventional doctrine. While obviously 
counterfactual in a number of real-world contexts, this assumption provides 
a model for a two-stage game in which states are assumed capable of 
making binding commitments and allows us to draw insights from that 
model. 
The stages that are to be analyzed include (i) adherence, and (ii) 
compliance. Under this two-stage game, adapted from Barrett’s model,7 the 
players choose in stage 1 whether to accept the customary rule or to take 
persistent objector status.8 In stage 2, adherents and persistent objectors 
choose whether to comply or to violate. This decision must be in 
accordance with the assumption, expressed above, that for any state that 
has adhered to the rule there is no choice as to whether to comply, provided 
that there are other adherents who are in a position to enforce the initial 
adherent’s obligations. This model also assumes that any CIL rule is 
binding, that each player knows what happened at the prior stage, and that 
each player examines its choices at each subsequent stage when 
determining what to do at the first stage—whether to accept the CIL rule or 
take persistent objector status. By this process of backwards induction, we 
can determine whether states would adhere to the rule or take persistent 
objector status. 
For simplicity, I begin with a two-person prisoner’s dilemma game. I 
use the prisoner’s dilemma here because it represents a context in which 
 
 6. I recognize that the application of CIL to international public goods cooperation problems 
seems strange. I use this example to highlight the incongruity of CIL with the most pressing modern 
problems of international cooperation. However, it is at least theoretically possible that the outcome of 
the recent climate change negotiations in Copenhagen would serve as a non-legal kernel (or selected 
equilibrium) around which a CIL rule could develop. Furthermore, note that the International Court of 
Justice has recently identified a customary international law rule requiring environmental impact 
analysis, so this example is perhaps not so very far-fetched. Case Concerning Pulp Mills on the River 
Uruguay (Arg. v. Uru.), Judgment, 2010 I.C.J. 1 (Apr. 20), available at http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/files/135/15877.pdf. 
 7. See generally SCOTT BARRETT, ENVIRONMENT AND STATECRAFT: THE STRATEGY OF 
ENVIRONMENTAL TREATY-MAKING (2003) (discussing Barrett’s two-stage model for state action 
regarding CIL). 
 8. Id. Of course, under CIL, adherence would often take the form of compliance. This does not 
affect the approach, assuming that future compliance has a sufficiently large value to overcome the 
incentives to simply take advantage of the first state’s initial compliance. States can also signal 
adherence through statements or other behavior short of actual compliance. 
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cooperation is tough to achieve. Here, the parties have incentives to defect. 
In other payoff structures, illustrated by games like the battle of the sexes 
or stag hunt, the parties do not have similar incentives to defect. 
The following analysis is adapted from Black, Levi and de Meza.9  
Assume that the payoff to each state for compliance with the hypothetical 
carbon reduction rule is rb-c, where r is the number of states that comply, b 
is the benefit produced by each complying state’s compliance, and c is the 
cost to each complying state of compliance.  In this payoff structure, the 
aggregate benefits rise in proportion to the number of states that comply. 
The payoff to a non-complying state simply equals rb: under the public 
good assumption, they get the benefit of compliance by others without the 
cost of their own compliance. Assume that b is less than c. Otherwise, there 
would be no need for a rule of international law: each state would by 
definition benefit from its own compliance in an amount greater than the 
cost of compliance. For example, with two players that both comply, and 
assuming c=3 and b=2, the payoff to each state from compliance is 1, 
because 2(2)-3=1. If neither state complies, then the payoff to each is 0. If 
one complies while the other violates, the complying state player gets a 
payoff of -1, while the non-complying state gets a payoff of 2. This is a 
prisoner’s dilemma. 
Now assume that states may agree to comply through adherence to a 
rule of CIL. Recall that we are assuming that the rule of CIL is strictly 
binding, so that it always results in compliance. Because this example has 
the structure of a prisoner’s dilemma, a non-adherent will play the strategy 
“violate” at stage 2; this is the dominant solution for a non-adherent. In this 
two-player game, assume that one state adheres to the rule in stage 1. Since 
that state is the only adherent, assume that the rule either never comes into 
being or cannot be enforced against it, and so it plays violate in stage 2, as 
it anticipates that the other state will also play violate in stage 2; it 
understands the other state’s dominant solution, and in fact is acting out its 
own dominant solution. The outcome is that both play violate: the same 
type of inefficient equilibrium that we expect in a prisoner’s dilemma. 
Here, however, there is a difference. There is an institutional mechanism 
for binding rules of CIL. States may move from a non-cooperative game to 
a cooperative game, with different payoffs and different outcomes. 
Anticipating the inefficient solution to the prisoner’s dilemma game, 
both parties examine their choices at stage 1. If one of the parties (A) 
adheres to the CIL rule at stage 1, the other party (B) faces the following 
 
 9. See generally Jane Black, Maurice D. Levi & David de Meza, Creating a Good Atmosphere: 
Minimum Participation for Tackling the ‘Greenhouse Effect’, 60 ECONOMICA 281 (1993). 
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choice. If B declines to adhere, then A will play violate in stage 2, as 
discussed in the prior paragraph.  B anticipates that it will receive a payoff 
of 0 if both parties violate. On the other hand, if B adheres, irrevocably 
binding itself to comply, A will be induced  to comply, securing a payoff of 
1 for B (as well as for A). So, in this setting, B will adhere. We might 
understand A’s adherence as an offer to contract, which B may accept by 
adherence. Adherence is a (weakly) dominant solution for both players in 
stage 1. 
As suggested by Barrett, this model works well for a two-person 
game, and the two-person prisoner’s dilemma when transformed into a 
cooperative game (in which binding agreement is possible) is easily 
resolved. This result is intuitive and certainly correct. In part, this two-
player case is simple. Where only one player adheres, it receives no benefit, 
but only a detriment. So it is perfectly willing to revert to the Nash 
solution: non-compliance. A Nash equilibrium is a set of strategies in 
which each player plays a strategy that maximizes its payoffs regardless of 
the actions of other players. 
But we are interested in plurilateral and multilateral customary 
international law. When this two-person model is extended to multiple 
persons, whether states will adhere to a multilateral custom will depend on 
the structure of the payoffs. In a game with n players, it may well be that a 
benefit is created through adherence by a coalition that is less than n. So 
reversion to Nash non-compliance may not be attractive to that smaller 
group. Second, depending on the nature of the required performance, and in 
particular on whether the benefit of compliance is a public good, as we 
have assumed, failure to comply or to exclude non-compliant states from 
the benefit may not be possible. 
Using the same formula provided above, we recall that the payoff to a 
complying state is rb-c, while the payoff to a non-complying state simply 
equals rb. Recall that r is the number of states that comply, b is the benefit 
produced by each complying state’s compliance, and c is the cost to each 
complying state of compliance. We assume that the payoff from non-
compliance, assuming all others fail to comply, is 0. Therefore, k states will 
comply if kb-c ≥ 0. Therefore, if the number of states k ≥ c/b, then these 
states will comply. Using the values of c =3 and b =2, if the number of 
states is greater than or equal to 1.5, they will comply. So, in this example, 
two states result (as stated above) in a payoff of 1, and since 1>0, they will 
comply. However, once the number of signatories reaches this level, other 
states will have no incentive to adhere—they will have an incentive to free 
ride. Adherence will result in costs incurred by the marginal adherents 
without affecting the behavior of other states. 
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The matrix in Table 1 below depicts this circumstance of a Prisoner’s 
Dilemma involving 5 states.10 For every state that complies, a pure public 
good is produced, giving all states a benefit of 2, with a cost to the 
complying state alone of 3. Each state can play either of two strategies: 
compliance or non-compliance. The dominant strategy is for each state to 
free ride and play non-compliance, because each of the payoffs for non-
compliance in the top row is greater than the payoff for compliance in the 
bottom row. The Nash equilibrium is an outcome where no state complies. 
 
Table 1: A Public Goods Game 
 Number of states that comply 




0 0 4 6 8 10 
Payoff for 
Compliance 




0 7 14 21 28 35 
 
However, in our two-stage game with the possibility of adherence to a 
binding rule of CIL, two states will be expected to adhere under these 
assumptions—that is, in equilibrium, the number of adherents is 2. This is 
because the payoff to non-adherents is greater than the payoff to adherents 
once two have adhered. For example, if 3 states adhere, the payoff is 3 to 
each adherent but 6 to each non-adherent (non-adherents do not bear the 
cost). 
Barrett shows that under these assumptions the gains from cooperation 
increase with b (the number of states), and decrease with c (the cost of 
compliance). This result is intuitive. However, less intuitive is the fact that 
the equilibrium number of state adherents increases with c, and decreases 
with b. This means that the equilibrium number of states will tend to be 
small when the gain from cooperation is large, and large when the gain 
from cooperation is small. Furthermore, in equilibrium, non-adherents can 
free ride and get a higher payoff than adherents. Of course, this assumes an 
isolated adherence game, without the ability to subject states to scrutiny or 
 
 10. The table is adapted from Todd Sandler, Treaties: Strategic Considerations, 2008 ILL. L. REV. 
155 (2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1000166. 
TRACHTMAN_FMT3.DOC 1/7/2011  4:05:16 PM 
228 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol 21:221 
punishment for “unilateralism,” that is, failure to join a plurilateral regime. 
Much depends on the values of the costs and benefits to each state. 
The core problem is one of free-riding: some states may realize the 
benefit of compliance by others, without incurring any costs themselves. 
Indeed, each incremental state would prefer to free ride, if it could ensure 
that enough other states would adhere. This behavior assumes that there is a 
public goods aspect to the cooperation problem. If, on the other hand, states 
that fail to comply can be excluded from sharing the benefits, the strategic 
challenge becomes smaller, although not trivial. 
To be clear, if states can be excluded from benefiting from the 
cooperation of others, all states should then be willing to adhere. By 
adhering they achieve a greater payoff than they would receive by failing to 
adhere. Even if the cooperation problem is characterized by a public-goods-
type set of payoffs, a relatively easy solution may exist, given the 
assumption of binding international law. Under the public goods payoffs, 
assuming binding CIL, the decision to adhere to the (binding) CIL rule, or 
to preserve persistent objector status, would have the characteristics of a 
“chicken” game,11 as described in Table 2 below. I provide a bilateral 
illustration for simplicity, but this illustration is readily generalized to 
multiple player circumstances. 




















Under these payoffs, each state’s best outcome is to abstain from 
agreement while others form a stable coalition that will generate the 
relevant public good. The second-best outcome is to adhere while others 
adhere. The worst outcome is if no state adheres. In this “chicken” game, 
neither player has a dominant strategy. In this particular case, there is no 
 
 11. See Ulrich J. Wagner, The Design of Stable International Environmental Agreements: 
Economic Thoery and Political Economy, 15 J. OF ECON. SURV. 377 (2001), available at http:// 
onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1467-6419.00143/abstract. 
 12. The table is adapted from STEVEN J. BRAMS & D. MARC KILGOUR, GAME THEORY AND 
NATIONAL SECURITY 41 (1988). 
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unique efficient equilibrium. Each player has two Nash equilibria: object 
when the other adheres, and adhere when the other objects. 
However, both players wish to avoid the circumstance where they 
each play “object,” and the even split in the northwest quadrant of the table 
seems intuitively attractive, although it is unstable. In order to achieve that 
even split, they should each commit to adhere. They may do so through a 
number of mechanisms. The simplest, in the treaty context, is a signing 
conference where each state signs a treaty simultaneously.13 Only slightly 
more complex is a specification of a minimum number of adherents prior to 
entry into force. In the CIL context, commitment to adhere may be possible 
through the requirements of persistent objector status: states go about 
complying, but if one state claims persistent objector status, others can 
avoid formation of the incipient rule or simply claim persistent objector 
status themselves. 
These settings are comparable to the chicken game, but instead of two 
wild teenagers hurtling towards a cliff, we have sophisticated diplomats 
sitting eyeball-to-eyeball. Although there may still be incentives to try to 
avoid contributing, and these incentives may sometimes hold sway, the 
diplomatic context takes place in a simultaneous and broadly linked setting, 
where unilateralism may be criticized and may be subject to punishment. In 
the CIL setting, it may be that the benefits of simultaneity are lost, but 
states may still anticipate the unraveling of cooperation and veer away from 
defection. 
In order for a revision rule, as defined above, to operate, we must 
relax the assumption of strictly binding international law. Assume that all 
ten states accept the carbon reduction rule of CIL discussed above, under 
the circumstances hypothesized above. Then, assume that the tenth state, 
realizing that in fact international law is not strictly binding, and based on 
its best alternative under the prisoner’s dilemma described, determines that 
the rule is no longer beneficial to it, and further determines to violate the 
rule. If the other states continue to comply, then the tenth state is in 
violation and will presumably experience some punishment. If a 
sufficiently large group of the other states use the violation by the tenth as 
an occasion to revisit their policy, and determine also to violate, then the 
original rule may unravel and be subject to revision. Note that the 
magnitude of the punishment, and the extent to which punishing the tenth 
benefits the other nine, may affect the course of action chosen by the other 
nine states. 
 
 13. It seems reasonable here to elide the distinction between signature and adherence, as signature 
brings certain obligations, including obligations to seek ratification. 
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II. TREATIES AND CUSTOM 
Interestingly, treaty law can have the same basic structure as that 
observed in connection with custom. A “persistent objector” is, in the 
broadest theoretical terms, analogous to a non-signatory, although 
persistent objector status seems to require affirmative action. Revision may 
occur, in accordance with the revision rule, by virtue of a new permissive 
CIL rule supervening a prior existing treaty. Of course, a finding of a 
supervening permissive CIL rule would have to involve a finding of opinio 
juris to the effect that the new permissive rule is the law. This finding 
would be especially difficult in connection with treaty, as opposed to 
custom, where the opinio juris would be required to contradict clear 
evidence of a written and binding restrictive rule. In effect, there would 
have to be some intermediate finding of desuetude14—that the rule is no 
longer in use—in order for the revision rule to work and revise the treaty. 
Consider the Vienna Convention provisions for reservation, 
modification, withdrawal, and termination. For example, the default rule 
for treaty termination, under Article 56 of the Vienna Convention, is that 
individual states are not permitted to unilaterally withdraw from a treaty.15 
This provision would leave only the revision rule as a means of withdrawal. 
However, treaty law has more institutional alternatives. For example, 
Professor Helfer claims that withdrawal clauses are “pervasive.”16 In 
addition, it may be possible to have inter se amendments to multilateral 
treaties under Article 41 of the Vienna Convention, if such amendment is 
not prohibited by the treaty and (i) does not affect the enjoyment by the 
other parties of their rights under the treaty or the performance of their 
obligations; and (ii) does not relate to a provision, derogation from which is 
incompatible with the effective execution of the object and purpose of the 
treaty as a whole.17 
First, in a normative sense, we would hope that these structures allow 
states the opportunity to form efficient agreements, without limitations due 
to limited forms of agreement. As we consider efficiency, we should 
examine not just CIL alone, but also the combined opportunities provided 
by CIL and treaty law. 
Second, from a normative standpoint, a “subsequent objector” rule—a 
rule allowing states to unilaterally denounce a rule of CIL post-formation—
would often destroy the value of international law, depending on the costs, 
 
 14. See Michael Glennon, How International Rules Die, 93 GEO. L.J. 939, 945 (2005). 
 15. Vienna Convention, supra note 4, at art. 56. 
 16. Laurence R. Helfer, Exiting Treaties, 91 VA. L. REV. 1579, 1582 (2005). 
 17. Vienna Convention, supra note 4, at art. 41. 
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including transaction costs, of denunciation. Based on a contract analogy, 
international law is valuable because it allows states to contract. By making 
international law susceptible to post-formation “subsequent objection,” 
international law would often be unreliable. Therefore, CIL would have no 
utility to address collective action problems or other strategic problems 
where defection is a concern (although it might have continued utility to 
address coordination problems where there is no concern about defection). 
Therefore, a subsequent objector rule would often be normatively 
undesirable. Bradley and Gulati respond to this argument in their article by 
suggesting that withdrawal would take some time or would not affect pre-
withdrawal obligations.18 This response seems to concede the normative 
importance of the Mandatory View. It also fails to take into account that 
some rules will have greater asset specificity, making these points 
ineffective to protect a complying state from strategic behavior. They also 
argue that reputational or other informal inducements would prevent states 
from strategically withdrawing.19 This argument seems to ignore the fact 
that the Default View proposal would remove the important reputational 
consequences of the existence of a mandatory legal rule. 
Third, this normative evaluation would have to recognize that not all 
international legal contexts are the same. We have foundational rules of 
international law and contractual rules of international law. There is 
international law that responds to coordination problems and international 
law that responds to cooperation problems. And there is a range of different 
types of cooperation problems. For example, within the cooperation 
problems known as public goods problems, a variety of different types of 
aggregation technologies exist. Further, there may be variations in the 
timing of performance or in the structure of reciprocity that might be 
reflected in the international agreement. This is important because it affects 
the optimal structure of international legal rules. In the context of custom, 
we must ask if it makes sense to: (i) go forward with a rule despite 
persistent objection; (ii) allow states to withdraw subsequent to the 
formation of a legal rule; and then (iii) continue with a legal rule after one 
or more states have withdrawn. 
Although there may be some range of cooperation problems for which 
a subsequent objector rule could be normatively desirable, the question 
then arises as to whether international law is useful in those contexts at all. 
This is the challenge that Bradley and Gulati must meet. 
 
 18. Bradley & Gulati, supra note 1, at 258-59. 
 19. Id. at 259-60. 
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The problem with custom is that, under the present state of doctrine, it 
is impossible to respond explicitly and definitively, or precisely, to these 
institutional design variables.  Rather, the doctrine of custom, unlike treaty 
law, cannot be self-consciously adapted to particular types of cooperation 
problems. This difficulty is one reason for the increasing marginalization of 
custom. Perhaps one explanation of the increasing codification of 
customary rules in the form of treaty is to facilitate institutional design. The 
following table compares some salient institutional options with respect to 
custom and treaties: 
 















No exit (except through 








Does not bind 
subsequently established 
states 
Modification No amendment (except 
through new custom) 
Designed arrangements 
regarding amendment 
 This comparison makes clear the greater design flexibility of treaties 
in all dimensions except for two: (i) consensus versus unanimity, and (ii) 
binding of subsequently established states. Custom provides for decision-
making by consensus and binds subsequently established states, unlike 
treaties. Regarding decision-making by consensus, it is possible for a treaty 
to provide for such decision-making, but treaties themselves may not 
otherwise be established by consensus. However, the practical difference 
between consensus and unanimity is not necessarily great: states may be 
bound by silence under custom, whereas they cannot be bound by silence 
under a treaty. 
The consensus rule may result in a fairly efficient, and surprisingly 
centralized, legislative process, both with respect to contemporaneously 
existing states, and with respect to subsequently established states. Oscar 
Schachter wrote that 
. . . as a historical fact, the great body of customary 
international law was made by remarkably few States. Only 
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the States with navies—perhaps 3 or 4—made most of the 
law of the sea. Military power, exercised on land and sea, 
shaped the customary law of war and, to a large degree, the 
customary rules on territorial rights and principles of State 
responsibility.20 
Indeed, critical legal scholars, post-colonial scholars, and others have 
explained that the formation of custom by metropolitan states, or by more 
advanced states, has a systematic bias against developing countries. So, in 
this sense, a rule of consensus is not necessarily normatively attractive. 
Furthermore, a rule of consensus might avoid domestic procedures for 
formal authorization or validation of the creation of international law. This 
avoidance, too, might or might not be normatively attractive, depending on 
the attractiveness of unrestricted executive action versus the attractiveness 
of parliamentary supervision. 
CONCLUSION 
Although treaties and custom have some differences as tools of 
cooperation, those differences are not necessarily very great. The main 
differences arise from the greater design flexibility of treaties and the 
greater scope for binding silent and subsequently established states to 
custom. 
Costless exit provisions in treaties would be irrational under asset 
specificity. It is indeed curious that there is no “exit provision” in custom. 
This fact would limit the utility of custom to cases where no exit is 
required, as in fundamental procedural rules, such as some of the rules of 
treaty law, or where no exit should be permitted, as in cases of asset 
specificity. However, where there is no asset specificity, the cooperation 
problem is rather small—it may be a coordination problem—and there may 
be no need to depend on the binding force of international law in any event. 
Bradley and Gulati’s paper is best understood as an argument for more 
capability for self-conscious institutional design in CIL. The problem with 
their argument, which may be insurmountable, is how to include variation 
in design in a customary process. This problem would suggest a good 
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